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Abstract 
 
The literature on market orientation is silent on the process of change involved in moving 
firms to a market orientation. Understanding this process is important for commodity sellers 
or industrial organizations with a traditional sales focus. We examine the change programs of 
two New Zealand-based agricultural organizations. Drawing upon Lewin’s three-stage 
change process model (unfreezing-movement-refreezing) we identify that the creation of a 
market orientation involves uncovering long-held assumptions about the nature of 
commodity products, the nature of production and marketplace power, and the ‘commodity 
cycle’. Moving the firm towards a new set of values involves changes in the role of 
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leadership, the use of market intelligence, and organizational learning styles. To refreeze 
these values, supportive policies are needed that form closer relationships between the 
organization and the marketplace. The degree of refreezing affects the quality of market 
orientated outcomes, with less effective refreezing leading to sub-optimal market-oriented 
behaviors. 
 
Keywords: Market orientation; Organizational change; Case studies 
 
Introduction 
 
The development of a market orientation will lead to a number of positive performance 
outcomes [Baker and Sinkula, 1999; Deshpandé, 1999; Harris, 2000; Kennedy, Goolsby, and 
Arnould, 2003; McNaughton, Osborne, Morgan, and Kutwaroo, 2001; Weerawardena and 
O’Cass, 2004]. Although research has shown that business-to-business firms are less likely to 
adopt a market orientation than business-to-consumer firms [Avlontis and Gounaris, 1997; 
Gounaris and Avlontis, 2001; Weerawardena and O’Cass, 2004], this same research also 
identifies that the relationship between market orientation and performance is stronger for 
industrial companies than for business-to-consumer firms. To date no studies have examined 
the implementation of a market orientation in business-to-business firms. As many business-
to-business firms have been shown to adopt a sales orientation [Avlontis and Gounaris, 1997; 
Gounaris and Avlontis, 2001] the implementation of a market orientation is likely to be 
difficult, and require top-down revolutionary change to long-held practices and beliefs 
[Narver, Slater, and Tietje, 1998]. 
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Despite the identified importance of a market orientation to firm performance, the 
implementation of a market orientation is an issue that has remained largely unexplored in 
the literature [Day, 1994; Harris, 2000; Jaworski and Kohli, 1996; Kennedy et al., 2003; 
Narver et al., 1998]. Harris [2000, p. 619] stated, “the topic of ‘market orientation’ will 
remain perplexing to theorists and continue to be illusive for practitioners” unless studies 
start to examine the processes and dynamics of developing a market orientation. Narver et al. 
[1998] identified two paths for organizations to move towards a market orientation, although 
no empirical research has examined the process of change associated with adopting a market 
orientation. To date, only one study has examined the implementation of a market orientation 
[see Kennedy et al., 2003]. Kennedy et al. [2003] identified three strategies - leaders’ support 
for change, interfunctional coordination, and the use of market intelligence, as assisting with 
the implementation of a market orientation. However, they did not focus on the actual 
process of change involved in adopting a market orientation. Such a focus would advance our 
knowledge substantially as it would identify practical implications for marketing managers 
and the importance of different support strategies at different stages in the change process 
[Narver et al., 1998]. Although the change management literature is replete with advice on 
the process of change per se, none addresses the specific processes involved in moving 
towards a market oriented culture; a focus which involves specific subtleties for marketing 
researchers [cf: Kennedy et al., 2003]. 
 
This article addresses the process of change involved in moving towards a market orientation 
in two New Zealand-based agricultural cooperatives. This responds to calls for in-depth 
studies of firms that, with or without success, have been involved in market orientation 
implementation efforts [Day, 1994; Jaworski and Kohli, 1993; Slater and Narver, 1995], and 
extends current research by examining the implementation of a market orientation in new 
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contexts [Kennedy et al., 2003]. We address two research questions: (1) How do firms 
deliberately change to a market orientation? (2) What strategies are most effective during 
different stages of the change process in relation to affecting a market oriented culture? The 
article has the following structure. First, we review aspects of market orientation including 
issues of implementation. Second, we review various change theories, placing emphasis on 
Lewin’s [1951] three-stage model of planned change. Third, we provide details on the two 
cases developed for this study. Fourth, we present the findings. Finally, we identify 
theoretical and managerial contributions. 
 
Literature Review: Implementing a Market Orientation 
 
Market orientation must be understood as a culture, rather than a set of behaviors and 
espoused values [Homburg and Pflesser, 2000; Narver et al., 1998] because culture mediates 
between strategy and implementation [Bisp, 1999; Deshpandé and Webster, 1989]. Bisp 
[1999] stated that the form and intensity of market orientation were manifestations of cultural 
commitment and strategic clarity. Market orientation is defined as “a culture in which all 
employees are committed to the continuous creation of superior value for customers” [Narver 
et al., 1998, p. 242]. A culture is “the pattern of shared values and beliefs that help 
individuals understand organizational functioning and thus provide them norms for behavior 
in the organization.” [Deshpandé and Webster, 1989, p. 4]. Little research also exists on the 
development of a market orientation per se, whether cultural or behavioral. 
 
Traditionally many New Zealand agribusinesses saw their responsibility for the product end 
when their produce leaves the farm / orchard gate [Crocombe, Enright, and Porter, 1991]. 
Marketing for agricultural products was controlled by ‘single desk’ sellers that engaged in 
 6 of 39 
generic country-of-origin marketing programs on behalf of the industry as a whole and 
resulted in the inability of many agribusinesses to develop diverse and innovative marketing 
strategies [Crocombe et al., 1991]. Agricultural producers have been under increasing 
pressure to develop new forms of competitive differentiation as a means of breaking out of 
commodity price cycles [Beverland, 2005]. The culture of commodity production represents 
the opposite of a market orientation [Narver et al., 1998]. Moving from commodity 
production to a market orientation therefore involves significant change in culture, strategic 
outlook, and marketing practices [Beverland, 2005; Narver et al., 1998]. Therefore, programs 
seeking to reposition commodities to create greater, and sustainable market value represent a 
rich context for studying the planned implementation of market orientation, a topic addressed 
next. 
 
Implementing a market oriented culture 
To our knowledge, no research has focused on implementing a market-oriented culture, 
although Homburg and Pflesser’s [2000] work examining the cultural characteristics of 
market orientation suggests firms must adopt new (or make changes to existing) artifacts, 
values and deeply held cultural assumptions. To date, Kennedy et al. [2003] have conducted 
the only empirical examination of implementing a market orientation. Narver et al. [1998] 
also proposed two paths towards developing a market-orientation. The findings / propositions 
from both studies, and the implications for our research are identified in Table 1 and explored 
further below.  
 
Insert Table 1 in here 
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A number of authors propose that senior management is critical to the successful 
implementation of a market-oriented culture [Kennedy et al., 2003; Narver et al., 1998]. 
However, questions remain. Firstly, are certain behaviors more effective at different stages of 
the change process than others? If it is important early on to challenge long-held cultural 
assumptions about products to drive an understanding “that there is no such thing as a 
commodity” [Narver et al., 1998, p. 243], for market oriented change to occur? If so, what 
role do leaders play in this process? Also, what strategies do they use? Do they develop 
mission and value statements first, and use these to drive change, or do values and missions 
emerge throughout the process? Triggering change may involve outside help, top 
management directives and formal education programs [Narver et al., 1998]. While necessary 
to trigger market-oriented change in commodity firms, the development of a shared vision is 
also vital to effecting market-orientation implementation [Kennedy et al., 2003] so that 
employees, through market-back learning, come to adopt new assumptions as part of their 
day-to-day work behaviors, eventually operating on these assumptions sub-consciously 
[Schein, 1992]. This suggests the behaviors of senior management, and their influence on the 
effectiveness of market-orientation programs changes during the duration of the change 
process. 
 
Also, when is cascading leadership necessary? It is likely that cascading needs to occur 
because bottom-up buy-in will be necessary for market-back learning [Narver et al., 1998], 
and the development of widespread cultural acceptance of change [Schein, 1992]. Likewise, 
is emotional commitment more critical during early stages of change, given the likelihood of 
barriers to change and resistance to new approaches [Harris, 2000]? Also, when is driving 
commitment to change more relevant in effecting market-oriented change? In regards to 
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interfunctional coordination, to effect market-oriented change established functions and their 
interrelationships may need to be reconfigured in order to support a market-oriented outlook. 
 
Finally, does the content and role of market intelligence differ throughout the change 
process? For example, early on market intelligence identifying poor performance, the 
effectiveness of alternative practices, and the continued decline of the firm’s performance 
may be used to bolster the case for change and challenge unsurfaced assumptions. Later on, 
market intelligence identifying positive effects of the adopted program (e.g., ‘short term 
wins’) will help reinforce market oriented assumptions and market-back learning, essential to 
the adoption of a market-orientation [Narver et al., 1998]. We now examine research on the 
change process. 
 
Approaches to organizational change consistent with adopting a market orientation 
 
This article focuses on examining the processes underpinning planned
1
 change efforts to 
achieve a market-oriented culture. Such a focus is critical given calls for a greater focus on 
the cultural elements of market orientation, as opposed to the activities and behaviors 
associated with the construct [Deshpandé and Farley, 1998; Homburg and Pflesser, 2000]. 
The adoption of a market orientation is likely to begin with a planned process for commodity 
style firms [cf: Narver et al., 1998] because the greater the distance between the firm and a 
market orientation, the more likely such change will need to be driven (at first) from the top 
                                                 
1
 In their review of change theories Van de Ven and Poole [1995] identified four broad approaches to studying 
change – teleological, lifecycle, dialectical and population ecology. We adopt as our starting point the 
teleological view of change, which focuses on planned change whereby the desired end-result set by managers 
in goals and plans drives the trajectory of the firm. In contrast, the other theories either deal with macro-level 
impacts on industry clusters (population ecology), deterministic cumulative and conjunctive stages in firm 
development (life cycle theory), or internal conflicts as drivers of new organizational forms (dialectical) [Van de 
Ven and Poole, 1995]. Such models are less relevant for studies of planned change processes [Van de Ven and 
Poole, 1995]. 
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down [Narver et al. 1998]. As a result we adopt as a starting point Lewin’s [1951] three stage 
model of change because this is the most relevant change model for radical, planned change, 
including moving from a commodity focus to a market orientation [Narver et al., 1998].  
 
Lewin’s three-stage change theory 
This article examines the adoption of a market orientation from the perspective of Lewin’s 
[1951] force field model of change
2
. This model characterizes change as a “state of 
imbalance between driving forces [pressures for change] and restraining forces [pressures 
against change]” [Wilson, 1992, pp. 8]. To effect change, managers must change the 
equilibrium between driving and restraining forces by creating pressure in favor of change 
[Burnes, 2004; Lewin, 1951]. This requires managers to unfreeze past practices associated 
with the status quo. As a result, ‘unlearning’ is critical to a learning orientation, and the 
development of a market orientation [Narver and Slater, 1995]. Unlearning involves the 
ability to question past assumptions [Narver and Slater, 1995]. This involves the uncovering 
of long-held, unchallenged, cultural assumptions concerning the ‘right way to do things’ 
[Schein, 1992]. As these are often sub-consciously held they must first be resurfaced through 
a change intervention. This unfreezing process may involve heated debate, and energize 
forces against change [Wilson, 1992]. Barriers to the development of a market orientation 
include threats to stability, fear of change, a belief that market orientation is inappropriate for 
the firm, and a fear of marketing-driven myopia (that is, focusing on serving the customer 
would result in the firm losing sight of their core values) [Bisp, 1999]. In summary, 
unfreezing involves surfacing and challenging past assumptions and practices. 
 
                                                 
2
 In a thorough review of theories of change, both Burnes [2004] and Wilson [1992] concluded that although 
many planned change models exist, they retain the essential characteristics of Lewin’s original model. 
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Should long-held cultural assumptions be surfaced and unfrozen, managers need to move the 
firm to a new set of assumptions [Lewin, 1951]. The identification of the need to adopt a 
market orientation is just the start of the change process [Bisp, 1999; Lafferty and Hult, 2001; 
Narver et al., 1998]. Lafferty and Holt [2001] proposed that incentives and training in the use 
of gathering and using market-based information were needed to operationalize these values. 
Narver et al. [1998] predict that movement will involve the following practices: deliberating 
role modeling; paying attention to, measuring and controlling organizational phenomena; 
reacting to critical incidents and crises; and creating creative tension. 
 
Managers must then refreeze cultural assumptions to affect a new state
3
. Depending on the 
degree of change necessary [Narver et al., 1998] refreezing may involve wider changes to 
firm structure and systems [Becker and Homburg, 1999; Day, 1994; Kohli and Jaworski, 
1990]. This is also likely to involve ‘market-back learning’ (learning from doing) as this 
reinforces the values of market orientation [Slater and Narver, 1995], and is consistent with 
the requirements of cascading leadership to effect market-oriented change [Kennedy et al., 
2003]. Bottom-up buy-in is necessary for the development of effective market orientation 
[Bisp, 1999]. Critically, a learning orientation is necessary to ensure the refreezing of market-
oriented cultural values [Baker and Sinkula, 1999; Lafferty and Holt, 2001; Weerawardena 
and O’Cass, 2004]. For example, Baker and Sinkula proposed that a learning orientation is a 
resource that influences the quality of market-oriented behaviors, “Firms may have a market 
orientation, but the quality of their market-oriented behaviors may be weak relative to other 
firms” [1999, p. 305]. In this scenario, employees are able to learn how to learn (generative 
learning) which involves constantly reflecting on past strategies and approaches to business 
                                                 
3
 While the refreezing process can result in institutionalizing practices that may subsequently need to be 
unfrozen due to later environmental shifts, Lewin saw the refreezing process as one that only approached 
equilibrium, rather than being a stable state [Burnes 2004].  
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rather than just learning through adaptation (trial and error) [Bell, Whitwell and Lukas, 
2002]. Baker and Sinkula [1999] propose that the adoption of such a learning process will 
result in higher quality market-oriented outcomes. Yakimova and Beverland [2005] support 
this identifying how firms with the behavioral characteristics of a market orientation [cf: 
Homburg and Pflesser 2000], could not effectively act upon market driven information due to 
poor learning styles. At this stage, leaders are likely to play a lesser role in driving change 
[Narver et al., 1998], as employees must reinforce market-oriented assumptions through 
practice [Baker and Sinkula, 1999]. In summary, refreezing involves institutionalizing 
assumptions and practices consistent with a market orientation. 
 
Methodology 
 
The use of qualitative methods is appropriate when studying complex processes [Eisenhardt, 
1989; Matthyssens and Vandenbempt, 2003; Yin, 1994]. A multiple-case approach was 
chosen due to the complex nature of the phenomenon at hand, and the need to take into 
account a large number of variables [Lewin and Johnston, 1997]. This study used the 
multiple case study approach of Eisenhardt [1989]. Eisenhardt proposed that richer theory 
could be generated with multiple case studies, as opposed to one single case. Eisenhardt also 
contended that the use of secondary data and multiple interviews in each case would help 
develop rich insights, and provide the basis for greater transferability of the findings to other 
contexts. These methods were adopted in this study. 
 
Cases were selected using theoretical sampling [Strauss and Corbin, 1998]. Two cases were 
selected for study – Merino NZ [MNZ] and the New Zealand Game Industry Board 
[NZGIB]. Both cases were selected because of their high profile marketing successes, which 
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assisted both industries turn around their ailing fortunes. Also, the simplicity of each case’s 
competitive scenarios and strategic responses, relative to larger, more complex producer 
boards, made these two cases more attractive. Finally, each case was selected because their 
programs had largely been developed, and each was now undergoing evolutionary change 
whereas, at the time of data collection, many other Boards were subject to Government-
sponsored reviews, or undergoing substantial changes processes where the outcomes were 
less certain.  
 
Prior to each interview, publicly available secondary material and promotional information 
provided by each Board was reviewed to increase the first author’s familiarity with the case. 
The first author conducted interviews at each Board’s head office in New Zealand. In total, 
nine in-depth interviews were conducted (three at MNZ, six at the NZGIB). Each interview 
lasted for on average four hours (range - three to eight hours). Given the control that both 
Board’s had on their respective industries, gaining insights from Board representatives and 
full-time employees was judged to yield the richest source of information of the process of 
change because each participant had been involved in the change program. At MNZ three 
interviews were conducted (this Board was substantially smaller than NZGIB). Interviews 
were conducted with the CEO, marketing manager, and marketing representative. At the 
NZGIB six interviews were conducted. Interviews were conducted with the brand developer, 
current Chairman, the largest exporter, marketing manager, and three past Chairs that had 
been involved in the change program (all were deer farmers). Interviewing stopped when 
saturation occurred – that is, when extra interviews began to yield few new insights [Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998]. 
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Questions focused on gaining a descriptive history of the motivation for change, the pressures 
for and against change, major objections, supportive programs, and ultimate successes / 
reasons for failure. Following the primary interviews, further information provided by the 
interviewees, or sourced by the authors was examined. This involved a widespread search of 
government documents, mandated reports, industry conference proceedings, books, 
conference papers, and consultant’s reports on each case, as well as a search of a local 
NewsIndex database to cover 10 years of history of each Board. This enabled us to examine 
farmers and customers views of each Board’s respective programs (due to issues of 
accessibility customers and farmers were not interviewed directly). In regards to farmers, as 
they did not drive the change once the vote was taken to move towards a market orientation, 
secondary data and notes from industry forums soliciting feedback (often highly critical) on 
the change programs were used instead of interviews. Customer feedback was accessed 
through industry conferences (again much of it critical), secondary publications, each Board’s 
website, and trade press articles on the programs. Over 120 documents were sighted for this 
study. Together these multiple sources improved the quality of the final interpretation and 
helped ensure triangulation [Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Yin, 1994]. The unit of analysis was 
each case studied. Therefore, information from each interview and the secondary sources 
were combined into one case manuscript. In total this process resulted in a transcript of 103 
pages (45 for MNZ, 58 for NZGIB). 
 
The cases were analyzed using Eisenhardt’s [1989] method of within-case and cross-case 
analysis. Firstly, each case was analyzed to gain a richer understanding of the processes each 
underwent to move towards a market orientation. A time line was developed for each. As 
each case achieved different degrees of market orientation, the cases were then compared to 
analyze similarities and differences and to gain greater understanding of the processes 
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involved. Theoretical categories were elaborated on during open and axial coding procedures 
[Strauss and Corbin, 1998]. Throughout the analysis we tacked back and forward between 
literature on change and the data, which led to the development of a number of theoretical 
categories and sub-categories [Spiggle, 1994]. Such practices are consistent with other 
studies on implementing market orientation [Kennedy et al., 2003]. 
 
Throughout the study, a number of methods for improving the quality of the research were 
adopted. Firstly, experts were used to help select the cases; two researchers provided 
independent interpretations of the findings; multiple interviews were conducted; and 
respondents were given the opportunity to provide feedback on initial findings, all of which 
reinforced reliability. While colleagues performed independent coding of the transcripts, 
interviews were conducted by the same interviewer, reducing the role of bias [Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985; Strauss and Corbin, 1998].  
 
Findings 
 
Background information on each case and the lead up to implementing market-oriented 
change are provided in an appendix. We suggest readers view this before examining the 
findings further. Information detailing the situation prior to and after market-oriented change 
for each case is identified in Tables 2-3. Lewin’s three-stage model of change was 
appropriate for capturing the change processes of both cases, and explains the difference in 
outcomes between the two cases. Each of Lewin’s three-stages is addressed below. 
 
Insert Tables 2-3 in here 
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Unfreezing 
 
Both cases had to unfreeze long-held assumptions before they could implement market-
oriented change. Poor returns, declining market share, and industry rationalizations provided 
the rationale for each Board to change. Both Boards engaged in vigorous and acrimonious 
debate concerning the nature of the ‘product’ and its position in the market. The following 
quote, recorded at a wool industry conference in 1997, identifies the split between those 
pushing for change, and those opposing it:  
“At four per cent of the world textile supply and falling, wool should be a rare highly 
sought-after fiber…. but we have got things seriously wrong. This generation’s fabric 
designers are unaware that wool characteristics could give them interesting variations 
and enable wool to set new directions in design and finish. The obvious has been 
completely overlooked – the natural differences which occur in wool from animal to 
animal, strain to strain and across strains. These natural characteristics are a fabric 
designer’s dream, but unfortunately are not available to them. “  
 
Management at each Board faced entrenched opposition from farmers and some elected 
Board members that was driven by an enduring belief that both venison and wool were 
intrinsically commodities, and that short term price falls were just part and parcel of being in 
an agricultural industry. These individuals were advocates of continuing the status quo. For 
example: 
“In the real world wool is struggling to attract consumer dollars. Whether some people 
like it or not wool is a commodity. Whether it was the finest Merino or the coarsest 
crossbred, wool was an industrial raw material, an ingredient product that was neither 
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used nor ornamented in its raw state. Consumers did not buy raw wool but finished 
products that they wanted.” [Wool Conference Speech 1997] 
 
In both cases, historical data was used to identify the long-term nature of falling market share 
and returns (despite investments in generic promotion, research and development and 
efficiency improvements). This objective information was used by those pressuring for 
change to call for a radical rethink to each Board’s approach, and was particularly successful 
in encouraging unfreezing. In particular, emphasis was placed on developing brands, 
delivering value to customers based on their needs, and moving away from pipeline 
efficiencies.  
 
Further cultural assumptions were also challenged. In both cases key cultural assumptions 
such as the ‘nature of interaction with the environment’ (passive acceptance of commodity 
cycles versus proactively changing the market’s rules), ‘nature of value’ (commodity versus 
brand), ‘the nature of relating’ (antagonistic versus trusting), and the ‘nature of time’ (future 
focused versus past focused) [Schein, 1992] were challenged. These are listed in Tables 2-3 
for each case. Typical of the approach to unfreezing was the call for widespread changes to 
marketing practices, positioning, and the assumptions that underpinned these behaviors. 
During the unfreezing phase, both cases questioned the totality of how they conducted 
business, and whether their current structures were to blame for poor performance.  
 
Those advocating change in both cases sought to build coalitions and political support for the 
change as a means of overcoming entrenched resistance. In both cases statistical evidence 
was collected to identify that the industry’s current state was not just due to normal seasonal 
fluctuations. Also, evidence was presented to show the downward trend in real returns for 
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commodity producers, and the effect that price uncertainty had on the size of the 
marketplace. Those advocating change also sought powerful supporters for their cause. For 
example, in 1998 the then Minister for Agriculture told a MNZ conference he was wearing a 
suit of 100 per cent NZ Merino wool, which would retail in Italy for NZ$2,000, although 
farmers would receive only NZ$80 at auction for the wool. Such emotive examples assisted 
those seeking change because their message focused squarely on what was possible to 
achieve. During this process, information was communicated via formal conferences, and 
newsletters and industry journals. This information was then used by those advocating 
change in peer-to-peer discussions. Since each Board required a mandate from its members 
for change, grass roots support for change was critical. 
 
Both cases followed the same process during the unfreezing phase – seeking to uncover and 
then challenge past assumptions. To do so they built up a powerful case linking past 
strategies and assumptions about the product, the nature of the industry and the adopted 
strategic outlook to continued declining performance. As well, they sought to communicate 
an image of a possible future, emphasizing key aspects of market orientation including 
rethinking customer and network member relations, an emphasis on customization and 
branding, and seeking to add value. Both Boards also sought to overcome resistance to 
change through the development of a coalition of industry members, key buyers, marketers, 
and even government stakeholders. During this phase, the emphasis was on increasing the 
forces for change and decreasing resistance to the idea of change [cf: Lewin, 1951]. The 
unfreezing phase ended when there was formal agreement for change to occur, and 
authorization (from a formal vote by members) given to build the basis for a new market 
oriented approach. Following this the movement phase began. 
 
 18 of 39 
Movement 
Once past assumptions had been successfully unfrozen and challenged, it was incumbent on 
senior leadership to develop alternative approaches (i.e. change programs) and then move 
their members towards the adoption of these programs. The first strategy to encouraging the 
movement towards a market orientation was to identify a strategy that fit with the resource 
base of the industry and its members. Details of both strategies are provided in Tables 2-3. In 
both cases, a market-oriented vision that could be accepted by as many members as possible 
was necessary. This identifies the importance of developing buy-in among influential 
organizational members before embarking on market-oriented change [cf: Wilson, 1992].  
For both cases, market intelligence during the movement phase served three roles. Firstly, 
research was conducted to identify market opportunities prior to brand development. 
Secondly, research was conducted with key buyers prior to the launch of the proposed 
strategy. Thirdly, results were communicated to members to gain support for the program and 
continue the momentum in favor of change. For example, the NZGIB conducted research on 
perceptions of venison in America as part of a strategy to target high-end US restaurants. 
Although the results reinforced traditional perceptions of venison they also highlighted 
sources of positioning – country of origin and nutrition. Research also highlighted the need 
for a dual marketing program targeting both end-consumers and channel buyers. As a result, 
a unique strategy started to take shape that involved investing the majority of marketing 
resources into trade programs, and using high profile chefs and sporting stars to build 
consumer awareness. Through this process, research results were communicated to members 
through a new internal marketing program including the development of a web page, 
newsletter, industry conference, and regional workshops.  
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Also critical during this period was the reconfiguring of established systems and functions, 
and the development of new ones to support the desired positioning. For example, the 
NZGIB had developed a number of quality programs to ensure deer were not stressed prior to 
processing (which affects the quality of the meat). These included fragmented programs 
covering transport, processors, auction, and farming. These were grouped together under an 
all-encompassing program called ‘From Pasture to Plate.’ MNZ developed a similar program 
entitled ‘fleece to fashion’. Both programs sought to identify the newfound scope of 
responsibility farmers had for their product under a strategy focused on building brand value.  
 
Despite the consistencies between both cases, one key difference that emerged at this stage 
surrounded the use of auctions to set prices. This was to have a profound effect on the 
success levels of both programs. Both cases sought to create sustainable markets and sources 
of value for their members. However, during this phase MNZ brought both industry members 
and channel buyers together to discuss mutual problems and possible solutions. For example: 
“We would work right from the farm right through the scourers, spinners, weavers, 
knitters, and the whole chain. What we are doing is opening up everybody’s books 
along the pipeline to get some real transparency in the system. Everybody has shown 
each other what their profit margins are - we have got it down to that level of 
transparency.” [MNZ] 
 
Emerging from these discussions was a shared understanding of the need for consistent 
supply and prices before any brand program could work. This was especially the case 
because inconsistent supply (brought on by hoarding in an attempt to push up commodity 
prices) made planning by customers difficult, and specialist processors in the channel had 
very little ability to absorb upward changes in price. By way of contrast, the NZGIB 
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remained unaware of this issue during the development of their program and thus built in 
measures that focused on increased auction prices as the key driver for program success. This 
was driven partly through ignorance of the need for changes in pricing mechanisms to 
support the brand’s position, partly due to the larger scale of the industry, and due to the 
multiple uses of deer
4
. As a result, MNZ were more successful at developing desired new 
cultural assumptions in regards to channel relationships. Effectively they challenged the old 
adversarial view towards channel members, and developed programs that saw all channel 
members as necessary to the future survival and prosperity of the industry. As a result, MNZ 
developed a program to encourage farmers to sign fixed term contracts with key buyers (by 
2004 40 per cent of sales used exclusive contracts for very large buyers). In contrast, the 
NZGIB stuck with their original plan, and continued to use auctions, which ultimately would 
affect their ability to refreeze new assumptions because auction driven inconsistencies in 
price and supply undermined the brand promise and relationships with key buyers who could 
tolerate little uncertainty. 
 
In each case management needed to overcome market skepticism to the programs and 
challenges to their power. For example: 
“It was very, very difficult for us to sell this strategy. We had some hard difficult 
negotiating to do with these big garment companies because they are not used to being 
‘pushed around’. The retailer really has the strength because in every market it is the 
retailer that has the strength because at the end of the day it is a retail buyer that places 
the order, not the manufacturer. Obviously we have to do development work with the 
manufacturer because you need that 100 per cent New Zealand grown material coming 
                                                 
4
 Deer can be processed for meat (venison), velvet (antler powder used in traditional Asian remedies), leather, 
and other body parts (hooves, tails, and sexual organs also used in Asian remedies). The Cervena program only 
covered the highest quality meat, while markets were still required for lower quality cuts. 
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through the pipeline to satisfy the retailer, but if the retail buyers specify New Zealand 
Merino in advance it makes what we are doing so much easier.” [MNZ] 
 
During this period, the tone of communications changed from argumentative (unfreezing) to 
educational, and from top-down, to increasingly collaborative as management sought to build 
support for their programs through involving key members and customers. Also, small 
successes, such as initial positive feedback about the emerging program were communicated 
to members to gain support for the changed approach, and importantly securing resources 
(levies were compulsory but each year there was pressure to reduce them). During the 
movement phase, bottom-up buy-in started to occur because although the initial debates 
during unfreezing identified the need to ‘do something different’, the exact details of the new 
program needed to be established and saleable to customers and members. By involving both 
sets of stakeholders in the development of the program, both Boards were able to claim 
legitimacy for the final strategy.  
 
In summary, the factors identified as driving market orientation implementation changed 
from the unfreezing stage to the movement stage. Leaders needed to move from building a 
case for change, to negotiating a shared mission and developing a set of tactical strategies. 
Also, they needed to combine their previous top-down approach with a more negotiated style 
in order to achieve buy-in from key stakeholders. Market intelligence was being gathered to 
identify market opportunities, with plans needed to be adapted in the face of market 
feedback. Communication strategies also changed, with emphasis a new emphasis on 
educational communicating feedback on early successes. As such, change was a combination 
of programmatic and market-back. The focus on interfunctional coordination moved from 
criticizing past arrangements to reconfiguring old systems and building new ones. The 
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movement stage ceased when both firms implemented their strategies by announcing their 
launch to their respective industries. Following this phase, refreezing needed to occur. 
 
Refreezing 
Refreezing involves institutionalizing the assumptions developed during the movement phase 
[Burnes, 2004]. Tables 2-3 detail the different outcomes with respect to market orientation 
experienced by both cases. We propose that the sustained success enjoyed by MNZ, and the 
short term success followed by industry crisis experienced by NZGIB can be explained by 
the different strategies of each Board during the refreezing process. During the refreezing 
phase, reinforcing the new market-oriented assumptions was critical. This can be done with a 
combination of methods including building systems that ensure feedback between market-
oriented actions and success, communicating successes, staying on message, celebrating 
market oriented values through new artifacts such as stories and myths, and rewarding people 
for market-oriented behaviors. Both Boards adopted a number of methods for reinforcement, 
although the inability to build effective feedback systems saw the NZGIB fail to reinforce 
their market oriented values. 
 
As a means of reinforcing market-oriented values, both Boards focused extensively on 
communicating short-term wins to their members (usually through newsletters), and engaged 
in public relations activities to raise the profile of each industry in New Zealand. During this 
phase, communications were celebratory (communicating short term wins), educational 
(communicating new programs and approaches), and persuasive (focusing on the need for 
ongoing commitments to the program and further funding). Both Boards tried to lessen their 
role in the process and allow for bottom-up buy-in through market-back learning. [cf: Narver 
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et al., 1998]. The following example was extracted from an industry workshop held by the 
NZGIB during this period:  
“It is important for farmers to try and find some sort of balance whereby the farmers, 
the venison processors and exporters, and the meat processors and exporters are 
comfortable that they can actually supply a product at a price that is profitable for 
everyone, rather than seeing each other as competitors and attempting to get as much 
margin out of each other as possible.” [NZGIB] 
 
The quote focuses on responding to how farmers ought to work with business buyers under a 
market orientation. Since each buyer has their own specific needs, farmers were complaining 
of the need to adapt to different demands. The NZGIB attempted to reinforce the assumptions 
of a market orientation by suggesting the benefits that would come from an increased 
commitment to fewer buyers. This continued emphasis on the program’s goals was a 
hallmark of the refreezing phase, although it was constantly undermined by the lack of 
supportive policies ensuring feedback between performance outcomes and market-oriented 
actions. 
 
The differences between the two cases approach during this period relates to the increased 
use of customized feedback systems that enabled adaptation to individual customers needs by 
each grower with MNZ, versus the use of one price schedule for venison farmers. Both 
Boards focused on quality improvement, although MNZ went one step further and built 
systems that enabled growers to may ongoing improvements in their product to suit the need 
of individual buyers (whereas the NZGIB members would be slow to react to customer-
driven changes because they would have to change the entire generic program). For example, 
MNZ’s made changes to the way wool was graded and sold. Previously, customers had no 
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ability to identify where the wool came from, nor any scientific evidence for the quality of 
the wool. As there was no feedback loop, farmers also had little market-based information to 
inform improvements to farming practices, which could lead to improvements in wool 
quality. As a result, MNZ invested funds in central grading facility called ‘PAC.’ After 
shearing, each fleece was now separately bagged and graded scientifically, providing better 
information to customers. Now each fleece can be linked back to an individual animal, farm, 
and customer. This information enables growers to identify which fleece went into each bale 
and what that bale sold for. This improves on-farm decision-making, and allows the grower 
to make improvements based on individual customer requirements. 
 
The market intelligence provided by the PAC allows each farmer to fine tune their approach 
and critically, to ‘extract causality to identify the benefits of the programs’ [cf: Kennedy et 
al., 2003]. In the case of MNZ they were able to illustrate a causal link between their 
activities, and market-based success. This also enabled farmers to engage in a market-back 
learning orientation (or generative learning) [Baker and Sinkula, 1999; Narver et al., 1998]. 
Such a result meant MNZ not only had a market orientation, they also enjoyed high quality 
market-oriented outcomes, and drove markets through new innovations with buyers such as 
co-developed products like ‘Zealander’, ‘Opossum Wool’, and ‘Denim Wool’. In contrast, 
the NZGIB did not develop intelligence systems that could identify the benefit of this one 
program to the overall industry. For example: 
“That’s part of the fact that everyone was active in the market before we got there. If 
you were starting with a new market and no one actually had any market share you 
could probably sort out some territories. We might have factored in transparency in so 
that the benefits of the program to the producers could have been seen. You might have 
asked the exporters to have a second [pricing] schedule for branded sales.” [NZGIB] 
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As a result, farmers voted to make the brand program (which only accounted for 10 per cent 
of sales) financially independent in 2001 under the banner ‘Who Benefits, Who Pays’ 
whereby market-oriented programs had to be funded by those who directly benefited. This 
resulted in a counter movement that undid some of the changes, and limited the refreezing 
that could take place. As a result, while some market-oriented objectives were achieved, they 
were of lower quality than MNZ, and, by 2002, the industry as a whole entered its worst 
downturn in a decade (the situation had worsened by 2005), although branded venison prices 
have fallen less, and customers still retain interest in the program. 
 
During this time, NZGIB communications changed from an educational tone to a more 
critical one, whereby Board members sought to regain the momentum by working within the 
current framework of auction pricing. What was needed was path breaking change 
[Siggelkow, 2001] whereby the rules of the game were radically changed rather than path 
driving change whereby the NZGIB continued to reinforce structural aspects of the old 
system that were no longer appropriate. For the NZGIB, the inability to move farmers away 
from auctions continued to lead to market-based problems, and undermined relationships 
with key buyers. This impacted on the quality of market-oriented behaviors [Baker and 
Sinkula, 1999], and the NZGIB leadership must once again defend its approach, and attempt 
to drive radical changes to the method of supply in venison markets. In contrast MNZ used 
the auction system to create interest in wool by running a finest wool competition whereby 
the world’s wool buyers bid once a year on the finest wool bale. 
 
In summary, refreezing involved building tight inter-linkages between strategies, cultural 
assumptions, supportive structures, communication and leadership style, and learning style. 
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That is, implementing a market orientation requires the development of a multi-layered 
(culture, systems, structures and strategies) self-reinforcing system. Refreezing was 
dominated by bottom-up driven change, with top down change taking an educational and 
celebratory role. During this stage reinforcement of market-oriented values requires market 
information that builds causal linkages between actions and performance. Refreezing was 
also achieved through the encouragement of customization and innovation driven by 
interaction between farmers and customers (and made possible by increasingly targeted 
market intelligence).  
 
Discussion 
 
This article addressed two questions. First, we identified that Lewin’s [1951] planned change 
model captured the dynamics of adopting a market orientation. Secondly, we combined 
planned change theories with the limited research on implementing a market orientation. We 
posited that leadership, the form and use of market intelligence, the form of interfunctional 
coordination, learning style and challenges would change across the three phases of 
unfreezing, movement, and refreezing. Based on a comparison of two cases, we identified 
how the role and importance of these variables changed across the three phases of the change 
process (see Table 4). This was supported with real time industry data, providing the first 
examples of the process of change towards market orientation. As such, this article both 
identifies new insights, and extends extant theory by building on the results of Kennedy et al. 
[2003] and Narver et al. [1998]. 
 
Insert Table 4 in here 
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The adoption of a market orientation by the cases illustrates the complex and often politicized 
process involved in implementing marketing programs. To implement a market orientation, 
the marketers studied had to overcome a lack of influence and formal power. As a result they 
formed coalitions with key stakeholders, used market research to influence organizational 
members, and had to continue to build and sustain support for a market orientation 
throughout the change process. To date, little emphasis has been placed on marketer’s 
political role within firms even though this is necessary to implement marketing programs. 
Future research needs to examine how marketers effectively implement strategies given that 
they often have little direct authority over functional areas critical to the implementation of 
market orientation. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
 
There are several limitations to this research. First, the study of processes would be improved 
if it were conducted in real time, and longitudinally rather than relying on historical 
information and interviewee recall. Future research should examine the change process 
involved in moving to a market orientation as part of a longitudinal, participant-observer 
study. Also, the findings relied heavily on the recall of a few organizational members, 
whereas future research would benefit from interviews conducted with a wide range of 
stakeholders. The results herein could have been improved by interviewing farmers and 
members critical of the programs undertaken to uncover further cultural assumptions behind 
opposition to change. This would identify the tension involved in managing across different 
levels of culture including those at an organizational, functional and individual level. Finally, 
these results focused solely on radical planned change efforts. Future research could examine 
more evolutionary, emergent efforts, perhaps with firms closer to a market orientation. Also, 
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research should be conducted in different cultural contexts and different organizations given 
that the findings here are focused on one country, and two cases of a specific form of 
organization.  
 
Implications for Managerial Practice 
 
The findings give rise to a number of managerial implications. First, the stage model of 
change identified in Table 4 provides the beginning of a road map for managers seeking to 
implement market-oriented change. Although the organizations studied underwent 
revolutionary change, such a process can be adopted to firm’s requiring more evolutionary 
change efforts. For example, firms that already have a set of market-oriented values but 
struggle to implement them effectively in the marketplace may be able to skip the unfreezing 
and movement stages and address issues of refreezing, perhaps by building in feedback 
systems and identifying short-term wins.  
 
Secondly, marketing managers seeking to implement marketing strategies in industrial firms 
often need to draw upon a wide range of organizational members (usually outside of 
marketing) and key customers to effectively do so. The cases identify a number of important 
political strategies associated with implementing marketing policies. Marketing managers 
thus need to sell the benefits of change to non-marketing staff prior to undertaking a change 
effort. This is part of an important coalition building process within the firm. Also, marketers 
will need to gain top leadership support for the change, and ensure this support will continue 
over a sustained period. The stages identified in Table 4 will help marketers to brief senior 
managers on their roles over the change period. 
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Thirdly, marketing managers must integrate market-oriented culture, learning style, and 
systems and structures in order to ensure effective refreezing. To ensure the co-development 
of such an integrated system marketers will need to give consideration to the development of 
educational materials, reward systems, methods of working together, systems that provide 
clear feedback loops between the actions of employees and performance, and reward 
employee-driven innovation. Change to reward systems and the encouragement of employee 
risk taking (to challenge past practices) will help ensure a market-back learning style that will 
help reinforce a bottom-up commitment to market-oriented change. (The role and 
characteristics of such change champions, and the management of such individuals needs 
further research.) Such changes will require cross-functional support and again highlight the 
need to build collations of support with other functions in order to undertake successful 
market-oriented change efforts. 
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Appendix 1: Background information on each case 
 
The New Zealand Game Industry Board (NZGIB) To gain market power the NZGIB was 
formed in 1985 with the explicit aim of coordinating the growth of the deer industry in New 
Zealand. The Board is a statutory body and has the power to levy all industry members 
(farmers, processors, and exporters) to fund generic research and development, quality 
programs, and industry level marketing strategies with a specific focus on developing export 
markets. Unlike other boards (statutory monopoly boards are typical of many agricultural 
industries in Australasia) the NZGIB does not trade in product; rather they develop generic 
campaigns that run in parallel with the individual branding programs of processors. The 
success of the NZGIB would be measured in increased market share and increased 
commodity prices. From 1985-1990 the NZGIB was successful in creating low price export 
markets for New Zealand farmed venison, eventually dominating the market (New Zealand is 
currently the largest deer farming nation with a total stock of 1,600,000 animals). The main 
market continued to be Germany, although this market was very competitive, controlled by 
six buyers (who colluded to set prices), and demand was driven by traditional game 
consumers who wanted to consume ‘wild’ deer during two traditional hunting festivals. Also, 
major buyers used venison from different countries to develop their own branded blend. As a 
result they were reluctant to cooperate with the NZGIB who wanted to develop a country of 
origin program capitalizing on the positive environmental image of New Zealand among 
Germans. As well, the farming of venison under strict quality controls (developed by the 
NZGIB) had led to higher quality products (wild venison naturally has large variations in 
quality, cut size, tenderness, and taste), greater production efficiencies, yet prices received 
were falling. The Chernobyl disaster, which saw radioactive fallout spread across traditional 
foraging grounds for European deer saw consumers refuse to eat venison. Without a clear 
market identity, New Zealand venison was treated no differently to European and the world 
price plummeted, resulting in many farm bankruptcies, the closure of New Zealand’s one 
specialist venison meat processing plant, and the exit of several other processors from 
venison production. Because of this rationalization, the NZGIB was charged with creating 
more sustainable markets for venison, including the development of New Zealand owned 
brands (for an overview of the Cervena brand see Beverland, 2005), and high value niches in 
new markets. As of 2004 49% of venison exports went to Germany, with the rest being sold 
in (in declining order of sales) Belgium, Sweden, France, USA, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, 
Netherlands, UK, and others. 
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Merino NZ (MNZ) Up until the early 1990’s New Zealand wool was sold through the 
International Wool Secretariat (IWS), which consisted of Australian, New Zealand and South 
African wool farmers. The IWS had developed the Wool Mark program as a means of 
stabilizing prices and increasing market share. The New Zealand Wool Board was 
responsible for regulating the industry, and unlike the NZGIB, had ‘single desk seller’ 
powers – that is, they were the only entity in New Zealand allowed to market and sell wool. 
Wool prices were artificially held up through stockpiling. This unsustainable situation ended 
in the early 1990s when wool price guarantees were removed and returns to growers 
plummeted. Merino wool makes up less than five per cent of the total New Zealand wool 
clip, and was usually blended in with other coarser wools, or Merino from Australia or South 
Africa, which due to climatic conditions is not as strong, or as fine (in microns) as New 
Zealand merino. The small size of the Merino industry (4 per cent of the total clip) within the 
overall New Zealand wool farming community (the Wool Board was controlled by farmers 
who voted on strategies) meant that these growers had little voice, and their higher quality 
products, desired by luxury fashion houses, had little identity or value. Following New 
Zealand’s withdrawal from the IWS in 1994, Merino growers began petitioning the Wool 
Board to exit and form their own industry grouping. They were successful and in 1995 
launched Merino New Zealand (without single desk selling powers) – an industry 
development organization dedicated solely to marketing New Zealand merino fibre. In 1996, 
following extensive market research, the New Zealand Merino brand was launched and was 
targeted at the world’s best cloth processors and leading fashion brands. Like the NZGIB, 
MNZ is funded by a compulsory levy on farmers (although not processors) and is run by a 
full time marketing team and an elected board. MNZ is also responsible for industry 
development, market development and growth, price maintenance and the development of 
industry owned brands. In contrast to NZGIB, MNZ is a niche strategist, accounting for just 
two percent of world fine wool sales. 
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Table 1 
Research results on implementing market orientation 
Study Focus Results Implications 
 
Kennedy et al. [2003] Compared two schools 
attempts at 
implementing market 
orientation. Offered 
explanations as to why 
one succeeded and the 
other failed. 
Senior leadership support consisting of: 
connectivity to ownership for change; 
high degree of commitment intensity 
and emotion; cascading leadership; 
driving commitment to change. 
 
Interfunctional coordination consisting 
of: complex interlocking customer 
orientation; internalized shared mission 
and vision. 
 
Market intelligence consisting of: 
extracting causality from robust 
stakeholder data; tying operational 
performance to customer requirements. 
 
Are certain leadership behaviors more effective during each of the 
change process? What role does leadership have in culture change? Do 
leadership style, intensity and commitment need to change throughout 
the change process?  
 
 
When do shared visions and missions need to be developed? Do these 
emerge through the change process, or do they drive it? Also, is this 
process top down or bottom up (or a combination)? 
 
 
Will the content and role of market intelligence be different throughout 
the change process? 
Narver et al [1998] Proposed firms sit on 
continuum from 
commodity focused to 
market oriented. 
Firms further away from market 
orientation would require greater 
degrees of change, which is more likely 
to be driven by top management. Firms 
closer to market-oriented end likely to 
go through evolutionary change that is 
bottom up. 
At what stage of change do managers need to move from a top down 
approach to a bottom up one? What strategies will achieve this?  
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Table 2: 
NZGIB Before and After Market Oriented Change 
Organizational 
characteristics 
 
 Before After 
The Organization   
Structure Government mandated industry body with marketing 
staff and elected board. Members fund generic marketing 
support. 
 
Government mandated industry body with marketing staff and elected board. 
Separate brand programs (labeled with the brand name ‘Cervena’) now 
franchised and run by councils of franchisees and Board (funded by 
franchisees). 
 
Markets served Primarily Germanic countries. Sell meat and leather on 
commodity exchanges. Antler velvet and animal parts 
(penises, tails, and hooves) sold unprocessed to Asian 
agents. 
High quality targeted at up-market restaurant buyers and specialist meat sellers; 
lesser quality cuts sold to mass retailers as unbranded. Skins sold to 
international tanners that sell direct to profile brands such as BMW. Antler 
markets same as before although antler powder now sold to high-energy drink 
manufacturers as a branded ingredient. 
Market orientation   
Culture Short-term focused: Responsibility for product ended at 
farm gate; commodity cycles natural; product focused; 
customers and network members viewed as antagonistic. 
More longer-term focused: ‘Pasture to plate’ view of responsibility for product 
although marketing activity viewed by members as a cost that should be borne 
by those who directly benefit; greater on-farm responsibility but still commodity 
cycle focused; view network members and customers as partners. 
 
Focus of organization Price, product and production efficiency. Product quality, support programs, brand, and relationships. 
 
Customer orientation Focused on price. No orientation towards leather 
processors, and Asian medicine channels controlled by 
agents. 
Support services surrounding brand directed at segments. Programs developed 
in conjunction with network members. Disconnect in relation to pricing and 
supply stability. 
 
Competitor orientation Viewed competitors as other deer selling nations. NZGIB now views competition as other meat producers regardless of type. This 
view not shared fully within industry, but is dominant. 
 
Interfunctional 
coordination 
 
Antagonism between supply chain members. Recognition of mutual dependence, and greater coordination between farms and 
processors, including adoption of processor specific on-farm quality standards. 
Performance outcomes   
Customer perceptions Large supplier of high quality low priced venison. Skins 
viewed as low grade. 
General belief in superior product quality and latent desire to support NZGIB, 
but support now conditional on price and supply stability. 95% of skins A-
grade. 
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Financials In 1992 price per kilo $NZ5.70. Total export value in 
1992 NZ$100 million, total exports NZ$55 million. 
Height of success in 2000-01 economic farm surplus for deer NZ$1,000 per 
hectare. 2004 figures $NZ26 per hectare and judged unsustainable. Price for 
venison per kilo 2004 $NZ3.75 (down from $10 in 2001). Programs added 
NZ$108 million in value 1998-2003 (on total average yearly sales of 
approximately NZ$236 million). 2004 value NZ$213 million.  
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Table 3: 
MNZ Before and After Market Oriented Change 
Organizational 
characteristics 
 
 Before After 
The Organization   
Structure Government mandated industry body with 
marketing staff and elected board. Members fund 
generic marketing support. 
 
Government mandated industry body with marketing staff and elected board. Members 
fund generic marketing support. 
Markets served Unknown – product simply blended with other 
wools and sold in bulk. 
Targets the ‘Merino NZ’ ingredient brand at elite cloth processors and fashion houses. 
Will also provide non-branded lesser quality wool to elite customers for secondary 
labels. Joint innovation with high profile fashion brands. 
 
Market orientation   
Culture Short-term focused: Responsibility for product 
ended at farm gate; commodity cycles natural; 
product focused; customers and network members 
unknown. 
 
Long-term focused: Farm to fashion view of responsibility for product; brands a 
source of value; customers and other network members viewed with respect; 
understanding of mutual dependence with channel members; value focused.  
Focus of organization Product and combined size. Brands, customer oriented value creation processes and relationships. 
 
Customer orientation None. Relational; very customized focus; customers can request individual animals from any 
farm; farmers deal direct with customers. 
 
Competitor orientation Other wool producers. 
 
Competing directly with all fibres. 
Interfunctional 
coordination 
None, complicated 11-member channel viewed as 
enemies, no interaction. 
 
Close ties between farmers, board, research and development, marketing, and channel 
members. 
Performance outcomes   
Customer perceptions Increase in price would lead fashion houses to 
switch to manmade fibres. Increased marketing 
spend and declining market share. Woolmark 
program had high awareness but little value. 
 
Overwhelming support among customers for NZ Merino, product of choice among 
leading processors such as Loro Piana, MNZ ingredient brand valued by fashion 
houses and features inside branded garments, sales of Merino products by fashion 
labels to end consumers at all time high. 
Financials Prices had been declining 3-6% per year over 20 
years. 
Difficult to assess as prices no longer based on auction price, but are negotiated 
privately. Industry and farmers report prices are sustainable and industry is the 
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healthiest it has been. 
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Table 4:  
Key roles, activities, and challenges during market-oriented change process 
 
Unfreezing Movement Refreezing 
Time of each 
stage 
NZGIB: 1 year 
MNZ: 1 year 
NZGIB: 2 years 
MNZ: 3 years 
NZGIB: ongoing. 
MNZ: 1 year 
 
Senior 
leadership role 
1. Build critical mass for change. 
2. Build broad based support. 
3. Appeal to hearts and minds. 
1. Negotiating a shared vision. 
2. Adapting market-orientation to resource 
base. 
3. Gaining buy-in from members and key 
stakeholders. 
4. Selling the vision. 
1. Communicating short-term wins. 
2. Continued emphasis on program’s goals. 
3. Encouraging bottom-up buy-in consistent 
with original vision. 
Interfunctional 
coordination 
1. Challenge the totality of current interfunctional 
arrangements. 
1. Reconfiguring traditional arrangements 
to support new strategy. 
2. Developing new supportive structures 
and systems to complement new strategy. 
1. Incremental improvements. 
2. Reinforcing shared-vision. 
Market 
intelligence 
1. Data identifying causal relationships between past 
practices and ongoing decline. 
2. Data appealing to future possibilities. 
1. Market-based research to identify 
customer / end consumer demands and 
perceptions of product / region of origin. 
2. Research with key buyers to support 
proposed programs before launch. 
1. Extracting causality from data to identify 
benefits of programs. 
Programmatic 
versus market 
back change  
1. Programmatic. 1. Programmatic and market-back. 1. Market-back and programmatic. 
Tone of internal 
communications 
1. Urgent, mix of fact and aspiration for new future. 1. Educational and informative. 
2. Increasingly collaborative. 
1. Reinforcing message. 
2. Celebrates initial successes. 
3. Educational. 
 
 
 
